A Transcontinental Alley-Oop: Antitrust Ramifications of Potential National Basketball Association Expansion into Europe by Genender, Paul R.
Notes
A TRANSCONTINENTAL ALLEY-OOP:
ANTITRUST RAMIFICATIONS OF POTENTIAL
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Olympic Games demonstrate, international sporting
events have been held for almost a century.' In recent years a
greater array of sports, led by professional leagues, have expanded
onto the international scene.' For example, in the fall of 1993, the
Canadian Football League (CFL) moved into the United States by
establishing a franchise in Sacramento, California.' The World
League of American Football (WLAF), although in suspension at the
present time, introduced Europe to the American version of football.4
Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National Hockey League
(NHL) each consist of teams from both Canada and the United
* I would like to thank Professor Herbert Bernstein and Professor John Weistart for their
assistance and guidance with this project. Additionally, I owe a great deal to my parents for the
love and support they have given me over the years. Most importantly, I want to thank Allison
for always being there for me.
1. The first modern Olympiad took place in Athens, Greece in 1896. THE WORLD
ALMANAC OF BOOKS AND FACTS 1994 841 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1993).
2. For example, the World Cup of Soccer will be held in the United States for the first
time in 1994. On Wings of Gold, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1992, at 8. This is particularly notable
given the low popularity of professional soccer in the United States. Id.
3. Craig Daniels, CFL Sets the Stage for a Big-Time Labor Dispute, FIN. POST, Jan. 16,
1993, § 6, at 50. Additionally, American CFL franchises have been awarded to Baltimore, Las
Vegas, and Shreveport (LA) with play beginning in 1994. Jim Thomas, Two Groups Express
Interest in Bringing CFL to St Louis, ST. Louis POST:. DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 1994, at 20.
4. The WLAF will resume play in 1995, with all of its six teams located in Europe. Brian
Lowry, Fox & NFL Team Up For World League, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 24, 1994, at 1. The
league's presence in Europe stems from its greater popularity overseas. Expansion of NFL,
World League Halted, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at C3.
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States. In addition, the National Basketball Association (NBA) has
recently decided to expand into Canada,5 and many indicators suggest
that the NBA's long-term expansion vision is even broader.6
Specifically, Europe appears to be the NBA's next targeted destina-
tion.
The NBA is a joint venture comprised of twenty-seven teams. 7
The individual franchises, as joint venturers, have entered into league-
wide agreements on a variety of issues, ranging from mundane
matters such as the rules of the game itself to more complicated
agreements covering, among other issues, player movement,8 revenue
sharing, the college draft, product licensing, and television rights.'
These complicated issues are not as essential to the game of basket-
ball as the rules of the game (e.g., how high the rim should be, the
length of the court, etc.). Nevertheless, they have proved vital to the
NBA's recent success. The NBA acts as a single, integrated economic
unit with respect to certain issues, with the league's revenue sharing
system as the most obvious example." Simultaneously, the joint
venturers maintain significant economic independence from each
other, since each team's independent revenues exceed those it
receives from shared receipts." In sum, the NBA can be character-
ized as an entity whose members both cooperate and compete with
each other, and, in a sense, cooperate in order to compete with each
other.
From an antitrust perspective, some of the aforementioned
practices are somewhat suspect. However, these otherwise question-
able practices are protected by a labor exemption to the antitrust
laws, which is encompassed in a collective bargaining agreement
5. The decision to expand into Canada by 1995 has been finalized. Toronto Gets Its Team,
FIN. PosT, Nov. 6, 1993, § 6, at 58. Furthermore, David Stem, the NBA's commissioner, has
recently stated that Mexico City will have an NBA franchise by the year 2000. David Bennett,
NBA Shooting for Mexico City, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 1994, at 6C.
6. Bennett, supra note 5, at 6C; see also infra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
7. Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Joint
Venture Agreement]. For a discussion of the NBA's organizational structure, see Chicago Prof.
Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp. 1336,1339-41 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
8. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National Basketball Association and the
National Basketball Players' Association, Nov. 1, 1988, arts. V-VI, reprinted in 2 MARTIN J.
GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACtiCE 1-131 (1993) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining
Agreement].
9. Id. arts. IV, XXV, XXXII.
10. Id. art. VII; see infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revenue
sharing system.
11. See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1341.
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between the NBA and the Players' Association." The absence of
this exemption in Europe, plus uncertainties about the application of
foreign antitrust laws, raises many questions about the exportation of
the NBA to Europe. Specifically, how would European Community
(EC) law treat the NBA's (1) restrictions on player movement, 3 (2)
legal existence as a unified entity, and (3) interaction with the existing
European leagues which would become its competitors?
The antitrust ramifications of NBA expansion into Europe are
the subject of this Note. Part II will examine the likelihood of NBA
expansion into Europe. Issues involving the NBA which arise under
American antitrust law will be discussed in Part III. Part IV will
examine how EC law would treat the antitrust issues surrounding the
NBA if expansion occurred. In particular, Part IV will analyze NBA
expansion into Europe under EC competition law: 4 first, under a
traditional Article 85 analysis; second, as a joint venture; and,
finally, as a service/distribution franchige. Part V will compare the
issues involved with the recent CFL expansion into the United States
with those surrounding NBA expansion into Europe. Finally, Part VI
will conclude that EC competition law and, where applicable, certain
member states' national laws, would treat European NBA franchises
more leniently than United States antitrust law currently treats
American NBA teams.16
II. THE LIKELIHOOD OF NBA EXPANSION INTO
EUROPE
There are many indications that the NBA will expand into
Europe in the coming years. First, the NBA's growth has been
unparalleled among American sports leagues over the past decade.'
12. See infra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the labor exemption.
13. See infra notes 41-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the restrictions on
player movement.
14. The EC's competition laws are found in Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11, arts.
85-86 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Competition law is the EC's counterpart to American antitrust
law and is similar to sections 1 and 2 of America's Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1993). The
Treaty on European Union (EU) amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community by replacing the term European Economic Community with the term European
Community. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7,1992,31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), art. G(A)(1).
Articles 85-90 of the former EEC Treaty are unchanged by the EU Treaty.
15. EC TREATY, supra note 14, art. 85.
16. See infra notes 274-278 and accompanying text.
17. From 1983 through 1993, NBA gross revenues have increased from $140 million to $1.1
billion. Elizabeth Comte, How High Can David Stern Jump? FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 42.
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Partly as a result of this development, the NBA has expanded the
number of franchises within the United States."8
Furthermore, the surge in the NBA's popularity has not been
confined to the United States. International interest in the NBA over
the past few years has been significant. For example, the enthusiastic
response to the 1992 United States Olympic basketball team, the
"Dream Team,"'19 revealed the global popularity of the NBA and of
basketball in general.20 In fact, according to some observers, the
NBA advocated forming the "Dream Team" in order to lay the
foundation for international expansion.2 '
In addition to the Olympics, international interest in the NBA
has taken many forms. The Federation Internationale de Basketball
Amateur (FIBA), the international basketball association, plans to
have the 1994 World Championships in Toronto in order to encourage
NBA players to participate.' NBA games are currently seen on
television in approximately ninety countries around the world.' In
Gross retail sales increased from $44 million in 1983 to $1.528 billion in 1992. Larry Whiteside,
Stem the Point Man in NBA's Team Effort, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Dec. 20,1992, at 84. The
NBA's television revenues have also grown over the past decade. The NBA received $88
million for network television rights and $11.5 million for cable television rights in 1983. Id.
Recently, the NBA agreed to a four-year $750 million dollar network television package to
begin in the 1994-95 season. Elizabeth Jensen, NBA Will Share Risk With NBC In Pact
Renewal, WALL ST. J., April 29, 1993, at B1. In addition the NBA negotiated a four-year $350
million dollar cable television package which will commence in 1994-95. Richard Sandomire,
N.B.A. and Turner in 4-Year Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,1993. Furthermore, league attendance
has risen from just over eleven million in 1983-84 to over eighteen million for the 1991-1992
season. Whiteside, supra at 84. The NBA's plan for growth is considered the "model in pro
sports." Herb Zurkowsky, NHL Strike Very Risky Business, MONTREAL GAZETEI, Mar. 29,
1992, at C2.
18. Recently, four expansion franchises were added to the NBA: Charlotte and Miami in
1988 and Orlando and Minnesota in 1989. Toronto Could Join NBA Mix, CH. TRIB., Feb. 22,
1993, § 3, at N4.
19. The "Dream Team" was the first American Olympic basketball team composed of
professional players. Jan Hubbard, Delivering the Dream; U.S. Leaves No Doubt Who's Best,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 9, 1992, at 5.
20. See Mike Downey, A Team that Lived up to Its Legend, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at
C10.
21. Joe Strauss, Retired Pros May Lead U.S. in '96 Baseball, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov.
5,1992, at HI; Jack Craig, Games Offer a Cash Course, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Aug. 9,1992,
at 55.
22. Ian Thomsen, FIBA's Dream May Put Championship in Toronto, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 15, 1992, at 18. In fact, FIBA's goal is for basketball to supplant soccer as the world's most
popular sport by the year 2000. Id. The NBA shares this view. E.M. Swift, From Corned Beef
to Caviar, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 1991, at 74, 82.
23. On Wings of Gold, supra note 2, at 8. Additionally, the 1993 NBA All-Star Game was
televised in a record 118 countries in 23 languages, translating into a potential viewership of
greater than 550 million homes. All-Star Summary, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 22, 1993, at 4C.
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addition, Europeans can watch these games on an ever-growing
number of cable channels.2 4 The McDonald's Open, a tournament
in Europe consisting of three European teams and one from the
NBA, was instituted in 1987.' Furthermore, league games were
played in Japan in 1991 and 1992.26 One NBA response to such
international interest in the league has been to establish offices in
Asia, Australia, and Europe.27 In 1989, there were no NBA employ-
ees devoted to broadening the league's international geographic base,
while in 1992, there were twenty-five such employees.?
A final indication of the NBA's probable expansion into Europe
is the league's recent decision to expand into Canada.29 This
expansion can be seen as a precursor to European expansion, for it
demonstrates the nascent stage of the NBA's desire to achieve further
global prominence."°
III. AMERICAN ANTITRUST ISSUES INVOLVING THE
NBA
Most antitrust disputes involving sports leagues center on alleged
violations of the Sherman Act.3 For the most part, courts apply the
Rule of Reason to such alleged violations by sports leagues.32 In
24. Swift, supra note 22, at 88.
25. Anthony Baldo, Secrets of the Front Office: What America's Pro Teams are Worth, FIN.
WORLD, July 9, 1991, at 38. The motivation behind this tournament was to develop new
markets in Europe for NBA merchandise and television audiences for NBA broadcasts from the
United States. Id.
26. Whiteside, supra note 17, at 84; On Wings of Gold, supra note 2, at 8. Additionally, the
NBA held exhibition games in Mexico and Canada during the 1993-94 season. Sam Smith,
Pippen, Jordan Skip Media Session, Fined, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1993, § 3, at 5.
27. Whiteside, supra note 17, at 84.
28. David Moore, Courting the World, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 6, 1992, at B1.
29. Toronto Gets Its Team, supra note 5, at 58. The NBA granted Toronto a franchise, and
Vancouver is currently hopeful of receiving an NBA team as well. Craig Daniels, The High
Price of Daily Bread, FIN. POST, Mar. 22, 1994, at 45.
30. Jack McCloskey, Minnesota Timberwolves General Manager, has predicted that the
NBA will be the first major sports league to place a franchise in Europe. Sid Hartman,
Zimmerman's Absence Hurts; Lineman Reportedly is Upset by Contract Status, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., May 8, 1993, at 3C. Furthermore, McCloskey envisions that the NBA will
eventually have its own league in Europe. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1993). Section 1 states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... Id.
32. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see infra notes 33-36
for a discussion of the Rule of Reason.
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Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,"3 the Supreme Court
defined the Rule of Reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
In addition, the Rule of Reason inquiry "focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.""5 More-
over, although the above passage is a valid definition of the Rule of
Reason, courts tend to apply other definitions.3 6 As a result, Rule
of Reason analysis is often unpredictable.
Generally, American professional sports leagues, fearful of
Congress's intimations about antitrust legislation, have accepted some
form of free agency rules.37 Free agency generally describes a
process by which players can, upon meeting certain conditions, move
freely between teams, thereby choosing for whom they play.
Antitrust questions concerning the NBA which arise under American
law pertain in large part to restrictions on player movement.
Given that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote
competition and that competition would suffer absent many of the
current restrictions imposed by the NBA, 8 there is an inherent
tension between the federal antitrust laws and many of the NBA's
current practices. This tension stems largely from the fact that teams
33. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 231.
34. Id.
35. National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
36. See eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); U.S. v.
Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
37. Allan Fotheringham, NHL - Lindros Battle More Basic than Patriotic, FIN. POST, July
2, 1992, § 1, at 9. In addition, when the National Football League (NFL) was sued on antitrust
grounds by its players to obtain free agency, it was the courts rather than Congress that exerted
pressure upon the NFL to adopt free agency. See Marvin Powell v. National Football League,
764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991). Moreover, in late 1992, the jury in Freeman McNeil v.
National Football League awarded treble damages to eight named plaintiffs, finding that the
NFL's Plan B free agency system was an unlawful restraint on trade. McNeil v. National
Football League, 1992-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 69,982 (D. Minn. 1992). As a consequence, the
NFL and its Players' Association subsequently agreed on more liberal free agency rules, which
were encompassed in a collective bargaining agreement. Gerald Eskenazi, Landmark NFL Pact
Approved, Contract Includes Free Agency Salary Cap, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1993, at C1.
38. See infra notes 41-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current restrictions
imposed by the NBA.
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in a sports league such as the NBA must cooperate in order to
compete, because absent some cooperation, certain teams could be
driven out of existence to the detriment of the league itself.39 The
permissibility of the NBA's restraints tends to depend on their
"reasonableness." 4
A. History of NBA Player Movement Rules
The beginnings of free agency4' in the NBA stem from the
Oscar Robertson antitrust case, Oscar Robertson v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n.42 A "right of first refusal" system has emerged, allowing
a player whose contract expires to sign with another team.4' The
player's original team has the ability to match that offer through the
right of first refusal." Player movement within the NBA is further
governed by league rules whose validity and strength are supported
by a collective bargaining agreement between the Players' Association
and the league.45 Some of these league rules are incorporated in the
NBA's Constitution and By-laws. 6
The present labor agreement is derived from one originally
reached on April 1, 1983, which sought to control player movement
through free agency rules and a Guaranteed Compensation Plan
39. Unlike a typical competitive situation, such as between rivals in the computer industry
(i.e. Apple and IBM), the competitors in the NBA are hurt when they drive each other out of
business. Unlike IBM or Apple, NBA teams rely on one another to supply the competition
needed for the league to prosper and do not benefit if other teams dissolve. This serves to
distinguish a sports league as a unique entity. See Robert H. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the
Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec., in 12-15 A.B.A. Sec. of ANTrrRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS
211, 233 (Apr. 1958-Aug. 1959); see also North American Soccer League v. National Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
40. See generally Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports,
DUKE Li. 339,343-351 (1989) (describing effects of restrictions on player movement in antitrust
cases).
41. According to Gary Bettman, former NBA Senior Vice President and current
Commissioner of the NHL, "You have to look at free agency as part of an overall system that
combines a salary cap, revenue-sharing and a college draft." Richard Sandomir, Free Agency:
Fighting the Good Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at B15.
42. Oscar Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd
556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977) (settled in 1976 and then approved by the 2d Circuit); Sam
Goldaper, N.B.A. Target of Players' Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1987, at B14.
43. Todd Stern, Antitrust Cases: The Ball Is in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1987, § 5,
at 8.
44. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. V.
45. Id.; Lewis Kurlantzick, International Sports Law Problems, NEW YORK LJ. Apr. 16,
1990, at 1, 6 (describing player movement domestically and internationally).
46. Constitution and By-laws of the National Basketball Association, Feb. 12, 1989
[hereinafter Constitution and By-laws] (unpublished document on file with the author).
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(salary cap).47 The original agreement featured a revenue-sharing
provision that guaranteed players at least 53 percent of the league's
gross revenues.' Salary caps and floors, based respectively on 53
percent of league revenues and 90 percent of that number (53 percent
of league revenues), were established.49 The agreement recognized
the right of first refusal which gave a team the right to match any
offer its player received from rival teams when that player's contract
expired." Under this agreement, a pseudo-free agent market
formed. Although players were not free to leave their own teams,
they could get the most compensation that any team in the league was
willing to offer.5' Interestingly, the NBA's growth over the past
decade corresponds with the advent of the salary cap and revenue
sharing in 1983.' 3
The current labor agreement,5' reached in 1988 after prolonged
negotiations, retains the existing salary cap but shortens the college
draft,55 limits the application of the right of first refusal, 6 and
relaxes the requirements for unrestricted player movement. The
rationale behind the salary cap is clear: by simultaneously sharing
certain revenues among the teams and limiting every team's expendi-
tures to the same extent, weaker franchises can compete evenly with
47. JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRTr. THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL
TEAM SPORTS 205 (1992) [hereinafter PAY DIRT]; see generally, Scott J. Foraker, The National
Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 157 (1985)
(analyzing the legality of the salary cap).
48. PAY DIRT, supra note 47, at 205.
49. d
50. Stem, supra note 43, at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For an in-depth history of the 1983 and 1987-88 collective bargaining agreements
between the Players' Association and the league, see PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS
INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 123-29 (1989).
55. The draft was reduced from seven rounds to three rounds for the 1988 draft and to two
rounds thereafter. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV(1)(a).
56. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. V. Under the current
agreement, the right of first refusal requires a team to offer players, not deemed to be free
agent, 125 percent of their old salary. The right of first refusal would only apply to players
offered more than $250,000. Id. art. V(3)(b).
57. See id. art. V. Beginning with the 1988-89 season, the agreement allowed seven-year
veterans whose contracts had expired to sign with any team subject to their original team's right
of first refusal. Id. art. V(1)(a). This provision extended to five-year veterans in 1989-90 and
to four-year veterans in 1993-94. Id. art. V(1)(a)(1). Currently, four-year veterans may simply
sign a one year contract for at least 125 percent of their previous year's salary and thereby
become unrestricted free agents after their fifth season. Id. art. V(1)-(3).
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teams in larger markets and bidding wars are curtailed without
obstructing the free agency fights created in Robertson.58
Because the current rules operate within the context of union
contracts, they enjoy immunity from the American antitrust law under
a labor exemption. 9 This is crucial since the NBA's salary cap was
ruled illegal in an antitrust suit in 1982.'o In fact, prior to reaching
its last labor agreement with the league in 1988, the Players' Associa-
tion filed suit in federal district court in 1987 alleging that the college
draft, right of first refusal, and salary cap all violated the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.6' In addition to filing this suit, the Players' Associa-
tion began decertification proceedings of its union in February 1988.
This action was taken in order to subject the NBA's restrictions on
player movement to antitrust scrutiny by lifting the labor exemption
from the antitrust laws.62 Because the suit by the Players' Associa-
tion and the decertification proceedings were abandoned premature-
ly,63 it is uncertain how the courts would have ruled.' Neverthe-
less, the threat of decertification by the Players' Association poses a
58. Joe Gergen, Commentary; Salary Cap Threatens to Disrupt the Knicks, L.A. TIMES, July
10, 1991, at C3.
59. Frances Ann Bums, Basketball Union Considers Decertification, PROPRIETARY TO THE
UPI, Jan. 13, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. For a more detailed discussion
of the labor exemption in professional sports, see Junior Bridgeman v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 961-67 (D. NJ. 1987) (discussing policies behind the labor exemption);
see also Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace
Competition in the Marketplace?, 60 TNN. L. REv. 263, 279-81 (1993).
60. The issue was resolved when the salary cap was negotiated into the 1983 labor
agreement. Goldaper, supra note 42, at B13; Bob Sakamoto, NBA Union Takes League to
Court, But at Least Averts a Strike, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1987, § 4, at 6.
61. Bums, supra note 59. Sakamoto, supra note 60, § 4, at 6. The Players' Association
later dropped this suit after signing the labor agreement with the league. The suit alleged that
the college draft was "one of the longest-running continuing restraints on competition for player
services in the NBA," that the right of first refusal was used by teams to prevent player
movement, and that the salary cap was a "powerful weapon for destroying competition for
players' services." NBA Players Sue for Free Agency, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1987, at C5.
62. Sam Smith & Bob Sakamoto, NBA Players, Owners Settle on 6-Year Deal, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 29, 1988, at C1. It appears that decertification was threatened by the Players' Association
in order to exert pressure on the league to arrive at a new labor agreement. Id.
63. Most likely, the decertification proceedings were abandoned because, despite the
players' complaints, the players have prospered financially under the NBA's current system. See
Mike Terry, Big Men Get Big Money, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at BI.
64. Presumably, the league would have argued that free agency restrictions are reasonable
because they: (1) foster competitive balance and team stability; (2) attract fans to support the
league; and (3) do not unreasonably restrain player freedom or bargaining power. The Players's
Association would have asserted that regardless of how prosperous the league and players are
now, the players would do even better without such restrictions. Stem, supra note 43, § 5, at
1994]
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risk to the player movement rules as they exist today, especially since
the current labor agreement expires at the conclusion of the 1993-94
season.
65
Under the standard outlined in the Bridgeman case,66 the labor
exemption would continue after the expiration of the current
agreement only if the NBA reasonably believes that the same terms
or close variants of such terms will be included in the subsequent
agreement.67 Therefore, there are ways to "bridge the gap" between
the expiration of the present agreement and the entrance into the
next collective bargaining agreement. Of course, decertification would
render this mechanism meaningless by nullifying any reasonable belief
that a future agreement would be reached.
B. Player Movement in the Foreseeable Future
The upcoming labor negotiations will center on several controver-
sial issues; foremost amongst these is the salary cap. While the
Players' Association wants the cap abolished, the league will not only
try to maintain it, but may also try to implement a rookie salary cap
in order to control the rapidly escalating salaries for players entering
the league.' Moreover, in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n
(Dudley), a federal district court in New Jersey recently upheld the
validity of several players' contracts which the NBA claimed
circumvented the salary cap.6' As a result of this ruling, many feel
65. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. XXV(1). If the Players'
Association is decertified and any of the NBA's restraints on trade are subsequently challenged
in court, the restraints would most likely be analyzed under the Rule of Reason, a test that is
inherently unpredictable. See Senate Committee Takes Swings at Baseball's Antitrust Exemption,
ANTrIRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Dec. 17, 1992, at 743. See also supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Rule of Reason.
66. See Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D. NJ. 1987)
(holding that although restrictions in a collective bargaining agreement do not lose antitrust
immunity upon expiration of the agreement, the employer may not indefinitely continue the
restrictions following expiration).
67. Id. at 967.
68. Terry, supra note 63, at B7.
69. Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n (In re Chris Dudley), 838 F. Supp. 172 (D. N.J.
1993) [hereinafter Dudley]. Chris Dudley's contract with the Portland Trail Blazers received the
most attention in the case. Dudley, an unrestricted free agent, signed a seven year, $11 million
contract with Portland. Id. at 175. The first year of the contract entitled Dudley to only
$790,000, the amount Portland could offer under the cap. However, the contract contained a
controversial "one-year out" clause which allowed Dudley to become an unrestricted free agent
after one season, thereby allowing Portland to exceed the salary cap and match any offer that
Dudley might receive from another team. Id. In effect, Portland indirectly offered Dudley far
more money than was available under the salary cap, although at some risk to both Portland,
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that the salary cap is presently rendered moot. 0 The court's holding
appears to provide the Players' Association with leverage for the
upcoming collective bargaining negotiations with the league.7' The
league will have to bargain in order to reestablish a version of the
salary cap that cannot be so easily circumvented.
Although there is less player movement in the NBA than in
Major League Baseball (MLB), for example, this difference probably
stems more from the NBA's revenue sharing system, the salary cap,
than from any difference in the two leagues' respective free agency
rules.7' MLB has no salai-y cap and therefore, does not have to
contend with that particular restriction on player movement.
However, since the advent of the salary cap the NBA has undergone
tremendous growth, suggesting a causal link between the league's
prosperity and the advent of the salary cap. The players have
benefitted immensely from this growth.7  Moreover, the salary cap,
despite the limits it imposes on player movement, ensures that league
salaries are in line with league revenue.
In its prior labor negotiations with the league, the Players'
Association has tolerated the salary cap in exchange for implementing
more liberal rules on unrestricted free agency, restricting the right of
first refusal, and shortening the college draft.74 Despite the prosperi-
ty players have experienced under the salary cap, many commentators
feel that, once again, the players will try to abolish it in the next labor
agreement,7 especially since the Dudley decision has, at least for
since Dudley could leave after just one year, and to Dudley, since if he became injured he would
have no guaranteed long-term salary. The NBA viewed this as a blatant attempt to circumvent
the purpose of the salary cap and contested the contract on three levels: an independent
arbitrator, the league's own special master assigned to hear grievances, and a United States
District Judge. Id. at 175-76. At each stage, the NBA lost its challenge. David Aldridge, Cap
in Hand, NBA Seeks Solutions, WASH. PoST, Nov. 9, 1993, at El.
70. Even the judge in Dudley recognized that his decision "may have a presently
unascertainable adverse effect on the very legitimate objectives of the salary cap.. . ." Dudley,
838 F. Supp. at 184.
71. David MooreJudge's Ruling on Dudley's Contract Gives Players Victory on Two Points,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1993, at 3B.
72. Eskenazi, supra note 37, at 1. The NBA's salary cap prevents the "mad scramble" of
players seen in MLB. Id.
73. The initial salary cap (for the 1984-85 season) was $3.8 million per team (over $300,000
per player). PAY DIRT, supra note 47, at 205. Today, it has risen to well over $15 million (over
$1.3 million per player). Team Payrolls, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 28, 1994, at 10B.
74. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, arts. IV, V.
75. There are two reasons that the salary cap may be in jeopardy in 1994: (1) the Players'
Association is no longer convinced that the cap is necessary, and, therefore, would prefer an
open market in a thriving league; and (2) from management's point of view, compliance or
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now, rendered the salary cap ineffective. The Players' Association
may view any other stance as a step backward. Nevertheless, it is not
certain that the players would advocate such a move, given the
potential risks they could face in a purely free market system.76
Many people believe that the Players' Association will accept the cap
in exchange for the league's inclusion of merchandising and licensing
proceeds in the total revenues from which the salary cap is derived."
Many others believe that the NBA will never relinquish the "tripod,"
composed of the free agency rules, the salary cap, and the college
draft, because these have provided the foundation upon which the
league's prosperity has been built.78
IV. EC COMPETITION LAW APPLIED TO NBA
EXPANSION INTO EUROPE
A. Overview of EC Competition Law
EC competition law is governed largely by Article 85 of the
European Community Treaty (EC Treaty). 79  The European Com-
circumvention of the salary cap requires too much effort. Gergen, supra note 58, at C3.
76. See generally Aldridge, supra note 69, at El (noting that players like Dudley take risks
by signing contracts that pay less than their market value in the initial year, with no guarantees
that an injury or poor performance will not diminish their market value when the players
become unrestricted free agents). Duke University law professor John Weistart has noted that
players "understand it would not be in their long-term interest to observe free-market rules.
Sport is in a unique situation as an industry. With unlimited bidding, someone can buy up all
the talent, competition suffers, and the industry itself is threatened because the fans lose
interest." The Free-Agency Fandango, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 12, 1987, at 15 (quoting
Professor Weistart). Although dissenters note that the competitive balance has not been
destroyed in MLB, the NBA's competitive balance is more sensitive to player movements given
the larger impact that any one player can have on a team's success. See generally Jeffrey E.
Levine, The Legality and Efficacy of the National Basketball Association Salary Cap, 11
CARDOZA ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT L.i. 71, 93-95 (1992) (discussing the positive effect the
NBA's salary cap has had on competitive balance in the league).
77. Aldridge, supra note 69, at El. If such merchandising revenues were included, the salary
cap could escalate to $29 million, a significant increase compared to the present figure of $15.2
million. Jeffrey Denberg, The NBA's Money Madness, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 28, 1993,
at El.
78. Denberg, supra note 77, at El.
79. This paper focuses on EC law rather than national law, based on the assumption that
NBA expansion into Europe "affect[s] trade between Member States," and therefore falls within
the scope of the EC's competition laws. See EC TREATY art. 85(1). However, despite the
supremacy of EC law, the national courts of the member states still play a substantial role in
implementing and formulating competition policy. See D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW
426, 430-37 (1993).
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mission (Commission) enforces the EC competition rules through its
Directorate General IV (DG IV), the Commission's competition
department."0 Article 85(1)81 is the European counterpart to the
Sherman Act of the United States.' However, unlike the Sherman
Act, Article 85 (3)'s contains a built-in statutory exemption to the
The Wilhelm decision is the leading case clarifying the relationship between EC law and
national law when both are potentially applicable. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,
1969 E.C.R. 1, 8 C.M.L.R. 100 (1969) [hereinafter Wilhelm]. In Wilhelm, the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (ECJ) decided that although the EC and German laws viewed
cartels from different perspectives, parallel proceedings could be conducted. Id. at 121.
However, to guarantee that the "general aims" of the EEC Treaty were adhered to, a parallel
national level proceeding could only take place if three rules were satisfied:
(1) "the uniformity rule," providing that "the national application of the law must not
prejudice the full and uniform application of Community rules, or of the full effect of
the measures adopted in the implementation of those rules;" (2) the "practical
effectiveness rule," providing that "so as to ensure in any conflict between Community
and national rules the Community law takes precedence (to protect the effectiveness
of the Treaty), Member States should not introduce or retain any measures that would
prejudice this aim;" and (3) the "parallel proceedings rule," providing that "it was the
responsibility of individual Member States to take appropriate measures to avoid any
risk that a national decision on an issue of competition law might conflict with
Commission proceedings still in progress."
GOYDER, supra, at 431.
The Wilhelm rules provide a clear response to a situation in which an agreement is
prohibited by Article 85(1). In such a case, both the uniformity and practical effectiveness
requirements make it impossible for a national court to exempt the agreement. Id. at 432. In
response to this situation, the Commission, in its Fourth Annual Report, placed the burden on
the "national authorities to avoid the risk of conflict, an obligation that could be complied with
so long as the national authorities had early consultations with the Commission or even
suspended proceedings whilst the Commission investigation was completed." Id. Therefore,
while national laws would take a back seat to EC competition law as far as NBA expansion is
concerned, they could potentially play a role.
80. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACrICE 242 (1990) [hereinafter KORAH I].
81. Article 85(1) prohibits as incompatible with the common market "all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .. " EC TREATY art. 85(1).
82. JENS FEbO, MONOPOLY LAW AND MARKE. STUDIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW WITH
US AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE AND SUPPORTED BY BASIC
MARKET ECONOMICS 105 (1990).
83. Article 85(3) provides that the provisions of Article 85(1) may be deemed inapplicable
in the case of any agreement(s), decision(s), or converted practice(s):
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EC TREATY art. 85(3). Subsection (a) above is similar to the Rule of Reason's least restrictive
means test used in the United States. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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mandates of Article 85(1) which can only be exercised by the
Commission.' Significantly, the national courts of the member
states cannot exempt those practices which the Commission interprets
as falling within Article 85(1).' Moreover, national courts face
difficulties in enforcing agreements that do not qualify for an Article
85(3) exemption, but nevertheless promote competition.86 One
drawback of attempting to obtain an Article 85(3) exemption is that,
due to the Commission's lack of resources in its Competition Depart-
ment, few formal decisions are approved by the Commission each
year.' Therefore, because a formal decision is necessary in order
for an individual exemption to be granted, the utility of Article 85(3)
is limited.' In addition, agreements that are purely national in
scope are outside the reach of Article 85, because they do not affect
trade between member states.89 Generally speaking, the prohibition
of Article 85(1) has been interpreted broadly by the Commission,9'
yet the Commission has interpreted Article 85 in a variety of ways.
84. Regulation 17/62 First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-
1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87. VALENTINE KORAH, FRANCHISING AND THE EEC COMPETITION
RuLEs: REGULATION 4087/88,5 (1989) [hereinafter KORAH II]. There are several weaknesses
which accompany the Commission's exclusive power to grant both individual exemptions under
Article 85(3) and general Article 85(3) exemptions. Id. at 2. An agreement violative of Article
85(1) is illegal and void until an exemption is actually granted by the Commission. Id. The
Commission must be notified by the parties seeking an exemption and the Commission may affix
conditions or obligations to the exemption itself. Id. at 3. Therefore, often the party to an
agreement has attained bargaining power over the other party to renegotiate the entire
arrangement. Id. In addition, individual exemptions under Article 85(3) are for finite periods,
providing yet another cause for renegotiation. Id. Finally, until the Commission grants an
exemption, national courts are unable to enforce those agreements which restrict competition
(i.e., violate Article 85(1)). Id.
85. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 5.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6. Since 1988, the Commission has rarely issued more than twenty formal
decisions per year under Articles 85. See id.
88. Id. The Commission informally discharges many of its proceedings by issuing
administrative letters. A "comfort letter," which says the agreement is not prohibited by Article
85(1), is useful for a party trying to enforce the agreement in a national court because the
national court is likely to agree with the Commission's stance. However, a letter indicating the
agreement "merits exemption" can cause problems in a national court, because such a letter
intimates that the agreement violates Article 85(1) and national courts are powerless to grant
exemptions, since the letter itself is not a valid exemption. Id.
89. Jean-Eric de Cockborne, Franchising and European Community Competition Law, in
FRANCHISING AND THE LAW: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 281, 286 (Christian Joerges ed., 1991). See supra note 79 for a
discussion of the interaction of EC Law and the national laws of member states.
90. KORAH H, supra note 84, at 5; see infra notes 209, 210, 212 and accompanying text
(examining the Yves Rocher, Computerland, and Charles Jourdan decisions).
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For example, in some circumstances, the Commission and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) have applied Article 85(1) expan-
sively, and have recommended that "any restriction on conduct that
is important in the market restricts competition, and that ancillary
restraints necessary to make viable a pro-competitive transaction
should be exempted under Article 85(3)."'" More frequently,
however, the ECJ has maintained that Article 85(1) is not violated if
an ancillary restraint on conduct is essential to make the given
transaction possible. 2
Furthermore, there are indications that the Commission will
begin analyzing transactions ex ante rather than ex post.93 In effect,
this development would encourage agreements which otherwise might
have never materialized.
In addition to granting individual exemptions under Article 85(3),
the Commission also recognizes "block" exemptions.94  Block
exemptions provide enterprises that conform their activities to the
Commission's requirements in a given regulation, with advance
clearance from violating Article 85.' Through the use of both
individual and block exemptions,96 EC competition law creates a
different set of presumptions from American antitrust policy. While
the EC exemptions create in many circumstances a presumption
against finding a violation, the American antitrust laws presume that
a restraint of trade is a violation until proven otherwise. 7 Moreover,
91. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 5.
92. Id. at 5-8.
93. In terms of franchise agreements, ex post refers to an examinination after the
franchisees have already devoted significant investments, while ex ante refers to an analysis
before many franchisees have committed significant investments. KORAH II, supra note 84, at
8.
94. Regulation 4087/88, infra note 95, is an example of a block exemption granted by the
Commission. See KORAH II, supra note 84, at 35.
95. See KORAH I, supra note 80, at 53. Distribution and service franchises, for example,
enjoy a block exemption from Article 85(1) under Regulation 4087/88. Commission Regulation
4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories
of Franchising Agreements, 1988 OJ. (L 359) 46 [hereinafter Regulation 4087/88]. See infra
notes 183-252 and accompanying text for discussion of NBA franchises in Europe falling under
this block exemption.
96. Enterprises can avoid the prohibitions of Article 85(1) by notifying the European
Commission, prior to entering the agreement in question, in order to obtain individual clearance.
EC: How Articles 85 and 86 Affect British Business, MONEYMAKERS, Oct. 31, 1989, at 63. The
Commission has stated that it takes a more lenient view in assessing fines towards parties that
have seriously attempted to avoid violating Article 85. Id.
97. Rene Joliet, Trademark Licensing Agreements Under the EEC Law of Competition, 5
Nw. J. Int'l L. Bus. 755, 815 (1983); see generally KORAN II, supra note 84, at 10-13 (contrasting
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the Rule of Reason is a far less certain counterpart to the Sherman
Act than Article 85(3) is to Article 85(1). Although this distinction
may appear subtle, it constitutes a fundamental difference between
the EC and American attitudes regarding competition/antitrust law.
The following discussion addresses the three central issues raised
by the NBA's potential expansion into Europe: first, the treatment of
the NBA's restrictive player movement practices under Article 85;
second, the legality of the NBA as an entity under EC joint venture
principles; and, finally, the interaction and potential competition
between the NBA and the existing European leagues under EC
franchising law.
B. Treatment of NBA's "Restraints" on Player Movement Under
Traditional Article 85 Analysis
1. NBA's Restraints in an Expanded League. The college draft
is the main process through which the NBA infuses new talent into
the league. Because a player's rights are owned by the team that
drafts him," the college draft is a restraint on the free movement of
players. Without question, the college draft would be the most
difficult restraint to administer if the NBA expanded into Europe."9
In many instances, European players have been drafted by NBA
teams.10 Conversely, many drafted American players have chosen
to play in Europe.' 1 Nevertheless, given the cultural, linguistic, and
economic differences between the United States and Europe, many
young players (both American and European) would not be pleased
to be drafted by a team on another continent."w This could lead to
players actually doing what until now they have only threatened:
sitting out one season and re-entering the draft, or sitting out two
seasons and then becoming free to sign with any team in the
league." 3 This could lead to inequities which would necessitate
the treatment of commercially similar agreements under EC and American antitrust law).
98. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV(1).
99. This is due to the reluctance of some players to play in Europe. See e.g., Barry Cooper,
Catledge Refuses to Play in Europe, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 27, 1993, at C8.
100. See Alexander Wolff, The Toni Award, SPORTS ILUSTRATED, June 22, 1992, at 56
(Kukoc has since signed with Chicago and is currently playing for the Bulls).
101. See Tim Povtak, Catledge to Play for Team in France, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 17,
1993, at D6.
102. See Wolff, supra note 100, at 56.
103. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV (1)(b) -(c). Although players
would not be paid if they sat out, they would be eligible to receive lucrative endorsement
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changes in the draft rules. Additionally, the inequities would help
and hurt both the American and European NBA teams. Presumably,
American players would want to play in the United States, while the
European teams would attract European players who do not want to
play in the United States.
The salary cap is another restraint which would be difficult to
apply since the different countries have different currencies and costs
of living. However, these difficulties could be overcome through
some basic research into the relative costs of living and strength of
currencies of the countries involved.
A final restraint, the right of first refusal as applied to an
intercontinental NBA, would not present problems in and of itself.
However, the problems arising from the administration of the college
draft would also apply to the right of first refusal: players being
forced to play in a country which they do not prefer. In a sense,
though, this problem is inherent in any restriction on player move-
ment, and a player in such a situation is not forced to sign with that
team in the first place.
The problems that would surround the administration of the
NBA's restraints upon European expansion would necessitate some
adjustments. In fact, the objections to these restrictions would be
very similar to those complaints currently voiced in the United States.
2. NBA Expansion and Violation of Article 85(1). NBA
expansion into Europe would seemingly violate Article 85(1) because
the expansion would involve agreements that would "affect trade
between Member States."'" The more difficult question is whether
such agreements would "have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common mar-
ket."1 5 NBA expansion would not intend to restrain trade in the
common market. However, it is likely that the effect of such
expansion would be to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within
the EC. Specifically, one probable effect on competition would be the
way the NBA affected existing European leagues. The second effect
would be the ways existing NBA practices would affect competition,
possibly in violation of Article 85(1).
contracts which could replace any lost income over the one or two year period. See Rick
Bonnell, Hornets Mourning at Odds; Agent Seeks Salary that Team Can't Afford, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1992, at D5.
104. EC TREATY art. 85(1).
105. Id
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a. Competition between European NBA teams and existing
European leagues. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are
probably the most attractive countries for potential NBA expansion.
In France, Greece, Italy, and Spain there currently exist well-
established and successful independent basketball leagues) °
Moreover, in Germany, basketball is rapidly gaining popularity as its
exposure on television increases.1' 7 The popularity of basketball in
these five countries indicates that NBA expansion to Europe is
potentially profitable.
The NBA, both in Europe and America, could become the focus
of European fans, to the detriment of existing European leagues and
their players. NBA teams in Europe could overshadow those leagues
and teams that currently exist to such a degree as to prevent or
restrict competition both among the existing European leagues and
between those leagues and the new NBA teams. Also, competition
within the common market could be distorted by NBA entry into the
marketplace. The European leagues currently garner the majority of
the EC's attention with the NBA serving as a remote alternative;
NBA expansion, however, could drastically change this focus. The
anticompetitive effects of NBA expansion into Europe on existing
European leagues could prove sufficient to violate Article 85(1). This
concern is particularly relevant considering the troubles that many
European Leagues are currently experiencing, including inflated
player salaries, insufficient sponsoring, poor integration among each
country's league, and poor marketing. 8 Given the fact that many
players have left the European leagues to play in the NBA during the
1993-94 season,"° it is possible that an NBA presence in Europe
would further damage the quality of the existing European leagues.
b. NBA practices that might violate Article 85(1). The NBA
practices most likely to violate Article 85(1) are those practices which
survive American antitrust scrutiny only because of the labor
106. See Sam Smith, Players Score Big in Europe, CHI. TRIB., Oct 24, 1993, § 3, at 13.
107. David Molner, Germans Embracing American Basketball, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17,1993, § 3,
at 13.
108. See Ian Thomsen, Bad Game, Good Time: British Basketball Woos a Family Audience,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 30, 1993, at 19; Ian Thomsen, The Next Kukoc is Alive, Well and
Waiting for the NBA, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 24, 1993, at 20.
109. The opening night NBA rosters for the 1993-94 season included twenty players who had
spent the previous season in Europe. George Shirk, Foreign Legion Heads to the States, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 16, 1993, at D3.
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exemption afforded to the NBA: the salary cap, the college draft, and
the right of first refusal. The salary cap would be a clear violation of
Article 85(1) because it limits, although indirectly, the amount of
money a player may earn. Many teams are willing to go well beyond
the salary cap in order to attain a marquee player. Moreover, in
reality many top players are underpaid because the salary cap
prevents them from receiving their fair market value."' The salary
cap would restrain trade in the sense contemplated by Article 85(1).
Similarly, the college draft is a restraint of trade because it limits
to one the number of teams for which a player may perform once
drafted into the league."' This restraint would be magnified by
NBA expansion into Europe because of differences in culture,
language, geographical location, and cost of living.
Along the same lines, the right of first refusal, although less
restrictive in recent years,"' would violate Article 85(1), albeit to a
lesser extent than the salary cap or college draft. Once a player
becomes eligible for restricted free agency he can, upon his team's
decision to match any long-term offer from another team, choose to
sign a one year contract for 125 percent of his existing salary."'
When the contract expires, the player becomes an unrestricted free
agent. Therefore, absent any immunity analogous to the labor
exemption the NBA enjoys in America, it appears likely that current
NBA practices would violate Article 85(1).
3. NBA Expansion in Europe and an Exemption under Article
85(3). In many respects, the Article 85(3) analysis for NBA
expansion teams in Europe mirrors the Article 85(1) inquiry. While
Article 85(1) focuses on the anticompetitive effects of agreements,
Article 85(3) addresses the potential benefits that such agreements
confer upon society. Specifically, Article 85(3) would first analyze
whether NBA expansion into Europe would contribute either to
"improving the production or distribution of goods" or to "promoting
110. However, teams maneuver around the limits set by the salary cap through mechanisms
such as deferred payments, annuities, etc. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8,
art. VII1(B)(1).
111. Under NBA rules, however, a player may sit out one season and then re-enter the
college draft or he may sit out two years and become free to sign with any team he chooses.
See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV(1)(c)(d).
112. The right of first refusal presently applies only to restricted free agents who can solicit
offers from other teams in order to have their existing team match those offers. See supra notes
43-58 and accompanying text for further discussion of the right of first refusal.
113. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 8, art. V(3).
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technical or economic progress.' 114  Secondly, irrespective of what
contribution expansion offers, Article 85(3) considers whether
expansion would "[allow] consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit.""' In addition, Article 85(3) would require that NBA
expansion be the least restrictive means to provide these benefits"6
and that it would not, by means of its exemption from Article 85(1),
eliminate competition in its particular market."7 An analysis of an
Article 85(3) exemption therefore begins by examining the competi-
tion between the NBA and the existing European leagues, and the
NBA practices which themselves might violate Article 85(1).
a. Competition between the NBA and existing European
leagues. NBA expansion into Europe would improve both the
production and distribution of a certain good/ser-
vice -professional basketball-for the European audience." 9
In addition to providing more exposure to basketball (both in person
and on television), NBA teams in Europe would most likely generate
even greater interest in both the NBA and basketball in general,
especially since the NBA is the most competitive basketball league in
the world. 20 Some commentators already believe that the German
league, currently uncentralized and underdeveloped, will be improved
significantly by the recent contract signed by a private television
station to rebroadcast NBA highlights on a weekly basis.' If this
114. EC TRFATY art. 85(3).
115. Id
116. Id art. 85(3)(a).
117. Id art 85(3)(b).
118. The Four Freedoms, upon which the EC was established, include distinct rules that
distinguish between goods and services. Id. arts. 9, 48, 52, 59, 67. In competition law, this
distinction is not needed, because "good" as it is used in Article 85(3) can be interpreted broadly
so as to cover both goods and services. KoRAH I, supra note 80, at 52. The NBA can be seen
as both a good and a service, the former because its tickets and merchandise will be sold and
the latter because it is a form of entertainment. Perhaps, alternatively, the NBA can be
characterized as a product, since "product" encompasses both goods and services.
119. For many years aging NBA players have played in Europe during the twilights of their
careers, much to the enjoyment of European spectators. Kurlantzick, supra note 45, at 1.
Recently, the European leagues have attracted young NBA players, most notably Danny Ferry
and Brian Shaw, to play abroad for a limited time before returning to the NBA. Id. This
phenomenon shows the interest that Europeans have in NBA caliber basketball, as well as the
money European teams are willing to spend to attract such players. Id.
120. Gary Hill, Basketball-NBA Style Pro League Planned for Asia, Reuters, Feb. 8, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
121. Molner, supra note 107, § 3, at 13.
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will assist the German league's development, then the NBA's
presence on the continent will have an even greater impact.
Economically, NBA expansion into Europe would create jobs for
athletes and businessmen, as well as generate investment in the local
communities due to the sale of NBA merchandise, television rights,
and season tickets. For example, NBA Commissioner David Stern
has suggested that an expansion franchise in Mexico City could inject
fifty million dollars into the local economy."= Additionally, having
the NBA in Europe would promote the European sports broadcasting
industry by further exposing it to its more experienced (in terms of
basketball broadcasting) American counterparts." It is difficult to
imagine a less restrictive means of bringing such progress to Eu-
rope.24 NBA expansion into Europe would promote interest in
professional basketball at all levels, not eliminate competition.' 5
b. NBA practices which might violate Article 85(1). The Article
85(3) analysis of the NBA practices themselves is less straightforward.
Arguably, the college draft, salary cap, and right of first refusal are all
necessary to maintain a competitive balance among the teams.
26
Those restrictions should therefore apply to European NBA teams for
the same reason. Furthermore, without these restrictions Europe
would not be able to benefit economically, technologically, or socially
from the NBA's presence, since it is these restrictions which have
122. Bennett, supra note 5, at 6C.
123. See generally, Richard W. Stevenson, Lights! Camera! Europe!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1994, § 3, at 1 (discussing the increasingly influential role of American broadcasting companies
in Europe and the need for American technology and capital on the continent).
124. Although some might argue that these advances are already present in Europe as a
result of the mass televising and merchandizing of the NBA that exists, the actual presence of
NBA teams would presumably do far more to foster the technological (e.g., the size of arenas,
quality of scoreboards and equipment) and economic growth of European basketball. See
generally, Ori Lewis, Basketball-Top European Event to Stay in TelAviv, Reuter Library Report,
Mar. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, LBYRPT File (noting that the European
championships will be held in a 10,000 seat arena, significantly smaller than NBA arenas).
125. It appears that NBA expansion into Europe would hasten a process that is, at present,
slowly emerging: the development of the existing European leagues as minor league feeders for
the NBA, in much the same way that college basketball acts as a feeder in the United States.
See generally, Ed Graney, Toni Kukoc. Between Two Worlds Europe's Best is Learning to Play
NBA-Style, SAN DIEG0 UNION-TRIB., Dec. 11, 1993, at D1 (discussing transition of former
European star, Toni Kukoc, to the NBA from the supposedly less refined European leagues).
See generally, Tim Povtak, Foreign Players? Mais Oui, SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 22, 1993, at 48
(discussing current scouting of European players by NBA teams.
126. See supra notes 31-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the NBA restraints
help maintain a competitive balance.
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allowed the NBA to grow to such a point that European expansion
is a possibility.27 It is uncertain whether there exists a less restric-
tive means for maintaining a competitive balance." Thus, as with
the competitive balance between the NBA and European leagues,
NBA expansion accompanied by the NBA's restrictions would
possibly promote, rather than limit, competition within the basketball
market.
c. Conclusion: Article 85(3) exemption is likely. Given the
relative ease with which the European Commission has granted
individual exemptions to Article 85(1),129 it is likely that the Europe-
an NBA teams would be exempt from EC competition law. The
Commission's tolerance of restraints of trade that accompany
technological and economic progress is demonstrated by its proposed
treatment of cooperative joint ventures.3 The Commission's Draft
Guidelines for the Appraisal of Cooperative Joint Ventures attempts to
provide "a more realistic economic" approach towards Article 85131
by adopting a more "flexible" stance towards restrictions which are
ancillary 32 to legal ventures.'33 Ancillary restrictions would be
treated and analyzed as a "package" with the entire joint venture, and
if the venture as a whole was acceptable, the ancillary restraints would
127. Before the advent of the current system in its basic form (in 1983), the NBA faced the
possibility of several teams folding on numerous occasions. For instance, NBA Commissioner
David Stem has stated that without the shared revenue received from the league, twenty of the
NBA's twenty-seven teams would have had net operating losses during the 1990-91 season.
Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1340. Presently, virtually every team is
in healthy financial shape and the league is competitive. See Bob Ford, At Owners Meeting,
NBA Hopes to Keep Lid on Salary Cap, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1993, at G7.
128. The issue is complicated by the fact that the labor exemption in the United States has
prevented the courts from subjecting these restrictions to a Rule of Reason analysis. Although
the salary cap was ruled illegal in the United States in 1982 (only to be subsequently included
in a collective bargaining agreement), a court's reasoning today may be completely different
considering the tremendous growth the NBA has undergone since the advent of the salary cap.
This growth would provide a solid basis for maintaining the salary cap in order to continue the
league's prosperity. For a more detailed discussion of American legal treatment of these
restrictions, see supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
129. EC. How Articles 85 and 86 Affect British Business, supra note 96, at 63.
130. This example is particularly insightful because the NBA itself is a joint venture,
technically speaking, and its expansion into Europe would be cooperative. See Joint Venture
Agreement, supra note 7, at 1-3.
131. Joseph P. Griffin, European Regulations Reviewed, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 34.
132. Ancillary restrictions are those "directly related and necessary to the establishment and
operation of the joint venture insofar as they cannot be dissociated from it without jeopardizing
its existence." Id. at 35.
133. Id.
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also be approved for at least a trial period." The college draft,
salary cap, and right of first refusal can be seen as ancillary restraints
on an otherwise "legal" expansion of the NBA into Europe. Based
on the NBA's shaky performance before implementing the salary cap
and right of first refusal, it is valid to conclude that these restraints
cannot be "dissociated" from the NBA without jeopardizing the
league's stability and thereby its future. Although there is a substan-
tial likelihood that the NBA could attain an individual exemption
under Article 85(3), there may exist more certain ways for the NBA
to avoid the scrutiny of the EC's competition laws. For example,
examining NBA expansion in light of both the EC's treatment of joint
ventures and service/distributional franchises provides two additional
avenues of analysis.
C. The NBA as a Joint Venture:135 An Approach Towards Gaining
Shelter Under EC Competition Law for the NBA as an Entity
EC law recognizes two main types of joint ventures:'36 concen-
trative 37 and cooperative.138  If a joint venture performs "on a
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity,"
then it is deemed concentrative. 39  On the other hand, a coopera-
tive joint venture has as its object or effect "the coordination of the
134. Id.
135. The NBA is a joint venture presently comprised of twenty-seven teams. See Joint
Venture Agreement, supra note 7, at 1, 2.
136. A joint venture is defined as a:
collaboration between two or more firms in one or more areas of activity. This may
take any legal form, joint subsidiary, joint committee, etc. It reduces the incentive for
the venturers to compete with each other in those activities, and may deter competition
between them in others. If more than one party could have operated alone, it may
reduce the number of actual or potential competitors, etc. Joint ventures may,
however, increase competition by enabling the parties to do what no one of them
would have been prepared to undertake independently.
KoRAH I, supra note 80, at 243.
137. A joint venture is concentrative if it does not have as its purpose or outcome the
"coordination of the competitive behavior" of independent firms. Griffin, supra note 131, at 34.
138. In a cooperative joint venture, the partners remain actual or potential competitors in
the relevant product and geographic markets. While cooperative joint ventures are theoretically
subject to both Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, in practice, Article 86 is rarely at issue.
Frank L. Fine, The Impact of EEC Competition on the Music Industry, 12 Nw. J. INT'L LAW &
Bus. 508, 516 (1992).
139. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 12 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, art. 3(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 4 [hereinafter Merger Regulation]. A
central issue in appraising the autonomy or independence of a joint venture is whether the joint
venture can exercise independent commercial policy; that is, whether the joint venture can plan,
decide, and perform as an independent unit in business matters. Griffin, supra note 131, at 34.
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competitive behaviour [sic] of undertakings which remain indepen-
dent.... ."14' A block exemption for joint ventures does not exist
at the present time.41 However, certain concentrative joint ventures
fall within the EC's Regulation on Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings (Merger Regulation), implemented in 1990, and
containing certain rules which operate as a block exemption. 42 As
a result, concentrative and cooperative joint ventures are judged by
different legal standards.
The test of legality for concentrative joint ventures is whether the
concentration creates or strengthens "a dominant position as a result
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded" in the
EC or in a substantial part of the EC.'41 The legality of cooperative
joint ventures is evaluated according to the more burdensome
requirements of Article 85(1), requiring that the entity "affect trade
between Member States" and have as its intention or effect "the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market."1" Nevertheless, a joint venture that violates Article 85(1)
may still be granted an individual exemption under Article 85(3). 4
All cooperative joint ventures are presently analyzed under Articles
85(1) and 85(3) on a case-by-case basis." 6
The distinction in current EC law between concentrative and
cooperative joint ventures has three noteworthy consequences. First,
concentrative joint ventures are evaluated under the less strenuous
test of substantive legality established in the Merger Regulation. 47
Second, concentrative joint ventures are subject to the mandatory
five-month time limit for decisions to be made by the Commission
after notification set forth in the Merger Regulation. Decisions under
Article 85 often take approximately eighteen months.4 Finally,
while the competition laws of the member states do not apply to
concentrative joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures are frequently
litigated in national courts.49
140. Merger Regulation, supra note 139, at 4.
141. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 196.
142. Id. at 196-97.
143. Merger Regulation, supra note 139, at 3.
144. EC TREATY art. 85(1).
145. Id art. 85(3).
146. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 196.
147. Merger Regulation, supra note 139, at 4.
148. Griffin, supra note 131, at 34.
149. Id.
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The Commission's August 1990 Joint Venture Notice (Notice)
attempted to define and distinguish concentrative and cooperative
joint ventures.' 5 However, the effect of the Notice, according to
one scholar, is to narrow the scope of concentrative joint ventures to
the point that the parties to a concentrative joint venture are not
permitted to have any control over the venture, but instead must
operate "only as shareholders."'' Because fewer ventures will meet
this narrowed definition of concentrative, more joint ventures will be
subjected to Article 85 scrutiny.52
In response to the advantages of structuring a joint venture as
concentrative rather than cooperative, the Commission has suggested
publishing the Draft Guidelines for the Appraisal of Cooperative Joint
Ventures (Guidelines). The Guidelines seek to provide "a more
realistic economic approach to the commission's analysis of coopera-
tive ventures" under Article 85."5 In order to remove the disparate
treatment afforded concentrative and cooperative joint ventures, the
Guidelines make several suggestions. First, the appraisal of whether
a venture is concentrative or cooperative does not depend on the
venture's legal structure. Rather, the assessment depends on the
restrictiveness of the agreed-upon clauses and the impact of the joint
venture's establishment and operation on market conditions."5
Specifically, the joint venture's impact on competition would depend
on several factors, including:
[t]he market shares of the parent companies and the joint venture,
the structure of the relevant market and the degree of concentra-
tion in the sector concerned[;] [t]he economic and financial strength
of the parent companies, and any technical or commercial edge that
they may have[;] [t]he market proximity of the activities carried out
by the joint venture[;] [w]hether the fields of activity of the parent
companies and the joint venture are identical or interdependent[;]
the scale of the joint venture's activities in relation to those of its
parents[;] the extent to which the arrangements between the firms
concerned are restrictive[;] [and] [t]he extent to which the operation
keeps out third parties."
150. See Commission Notice 4064/89 of21 December 1989 Regarding the Concentrative and
Cooperative Operations, 1990 OJ. (C 203) 10.
151. KoRAH I, supra note 80, at 215.
152. Id.
153. Griffin, supra note 131, at 34.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 35.
156. Id.
1994]
316 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:291
Second, the Guidelines propose the adoption of a more flexible
attitude towards restraints that are ancillary to legal ventures, thereby
treating the ancillary restraints as a package with the joint ven-
ture.57 Finally, the Guidelines propose to mirror the five-month
timetable for rendering decisions used under the Merger Regulation
for concentrative joint ventures.5 The Guidelines demonstrate the
Commission's willingness to make the EC as receptive to cooperative
joint ventures as it currently is to concentrative ones. 59
The majority of joint ventures are cooperative, and therefore fall
within the jurisdiction of Article 85(1).' 6 Because the NBA's joint
venturers operate as more than mere shareholders, the NBA would
most likely be classified as cooperative.' 6' An overview of the
Commission's recent treatment of joint ventures under Article 85(1)
would shed light on the reception of the NBA by the EC.
The Commission has rarely rejected a joint venture outright as
being violative of Article 85(1). Moreover, although the Commission
has a history of strictly applying Article 85(1) to joint ventures,162
there has been a recent trend towards a more lenient approach163 in
which ventures have been permitted subject to the deletion of
unsuitable clauses in the venture agreements.'" The 'Odin deci-
sion 5 exemplifies this trend. Odin involved a joint venture created
by Norwegian and British companies to develop a container that can
be used for foods with long shelf lives. 66  This container would
compete with existing products like glass jars and metal cans. In
concluding that the venture was outside of Article 85(1), the Commis-
sion focused on the absence of actual or potential competition
between the parent companies as well as the fact that neither venturer
possessed adequate technical knowledge to produce the product on its
own. 67 Furthermore, the Commission took note of the agreement's
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 210.
161. See Joint Venture Agreement, supra note 7, at 1-3; Constitution and By-laws, supra note
46.
162. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 198.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 204.
165. Commission Decision 90/410 of 13 July 1990 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty, 1990 OJ. (L209) 15 [hereinafter Odin].
166. Odin, supra note 165, at 15; GOYDER, supra note 79, at 198.
167. Odin, supra note 165, at 19; GOYDER, supra note 79, at 198-99.
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restrictions concerning the use of the parents' proprietary know-how
and the obligation to keep such know-how secret.' r The Commis-
sion deemed these restrictions to be ancillary and therefore outside of
Article 85(1), rather than exemptible under Article 85(3), as was
previously the norm. 69
When compared to Odin, it appears possible that the expansion
of the NBA's joint venture to include a European joint venturer
might likewise fall outside the reach of Article 85(1). Like Odin, the
product to be distributed (professional basketball of the NBA's
caliber) could not be produced in the EC absent a joint venture
agreement. Also, the restraints that accompany the NBA's joint
venture are, arguably, ancillary, and thus fall outside of Article 85(1).
On the other hand, despite Odin and considering several other
cases, there is a strong possibility that the NBA's joint venture would
be deemed within the scope of Article 85(1). For example, although
the parent companies in the Optical Fibres case 170 were neither
actual nor potential competitors, the possibility that the network of
parallel joint ventures throughout the EC could potentially reduce
competition between the joint venturers prompted the Commission to
consider the joint venture within Article 85(1).'~' Similarly, it is
quite possible that the Commission would find that the NBA joint
venture would reduce competition between NBA teams and/or
between the existing basketball leagues in the EC, despite the fact
that the parent companies are not, actually or potentially, competi-
tors. 1 2 In such a situation, the Commission would next consider the
availability of an individual exemption for the joint venture under
Article 85(3).
In applying Article 85(3) to joint ventures, the Commission
concentrates on two of the article's conditions for an exemption:' 73
the first relating to the improvement of production or distribution and
promotion of technical or economic progress, and the second to the
indispensability of restrictive conditions (i.e., whether the restraints
are the least restrictive possible under the circumstances). 74 In the
168. Odin, supra note 165, at 21.
169. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 199.
170. Commission Decision 86/405 of 14 July 1986 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty, 1986 OJ. (L 236) 30 [hereinafter Optical Fibres].
171. Id.; GOYDER, supra note 78, at 199.
172. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NBA's need for
joint venturers to cooperate in order to make competition possible.
173. EC TREATY art. 85(3).
174. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 207.
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first category, the NBA would introduce a new competitor into the
EC and the member states, thereby possibly promoting economic
interest in basketball in the common market. With respect to the
second condition, the indispensibility of the NBA's restrictions
depends on the latitude which the Commission would afford the NBA
in its treatment of its ancillary restraints. 75
The NBA's joint venture can be distinguished from the
Screensport case in which the Commission refused to exempt a
venture from Article 85(1), therefore providing a further indication
that the NBA will need to gain an exemption through Article
85(3).176 In Screensport, the proposed joint venture between Sky
Television and a consortium of seventeen national television
authorities (members of the European Broadcasting Union)'" was
formed to operate the Eurosport satellite TV channel. The agree-
ment required the joint venturers to supply the Eurosport channel
with all the sports programs which they obtained and to offer priority
to Eurosport to air such programs for forty-eight hours after the end
of each event.7 8 A competing satellite company, Screensport,
complained that Eurosport's preferred access to the sports programs
would unfairly impede its own efforts to compete effectively with Sky
Television. 79 Sky Television countered that the venture would
enable those with satellite dishes to have a greater number of sports
programs to watch."8 The Commission's main reason for refusing
to exempt this venture was the "effect it would have on competition
not only between Screensport and Sky but also between Sky and the
members of the consortium itself who were also actual or potential
competitors in broadcasting sports events.11
81
Unlike the Screensport case, the NBA's joint venture would
arguably not stifle another competitor's ability to compete. Although
the NBA teams would potentially overshadow the existing European
leagues, they would also promote competition between the NBA and
the existing European leagues, as well as between the American and
European NBA teams. In addition, like Screensport, the NBA's
175. Id. at 208; J. Faull, Joint Ventures Under the EEC Competition Rules, 5 ECLR 358,364
(1984).
176. Commission Decision 91/130 of 19 February 1991 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant
to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1991 OJ. (L 63) 32 [hereinafter Screensport].
177. Id.
178. Id. at 32-33.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. GOYDER, supra note 79, at 206; see Screensport, supra note 176, at 43-44.
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venture would provide basketball fans with the opportunity to watch
a greater amount of quality NBA basketball."
It is possible that treating the NBA as a joint venture under EC
law could mean the difference between falling within or outside of
Article 85(1). Generally, the EC's attitude toward joint ventures
indicates an apparent willingness to broaden the European
Community's economic and cultural horizons. The NBA could
seemingly fulfill this goal.
D. The NBA Under EC Franchising Law: A Means to Allow the
NBA to Coexist with the Existing European Leagues
1. Franchising in the EC. Franchising is an expanding
phenomenon in Europe, frequently occurring on an international
basis."8 The Commission has defined a franchise as a "package of
industrial or intellectual property rights relating to trade marks, trade
names, shop signs, utility models, designs, copyrights, know-how or
patents, [including] ... [t]he communication by the franchisor to the
franchisee of [substantial] know-how" conferring a competitive
advantage on the latter.'" There are three types of basic franchise
agreements: industrial, service, and distribution."8  Under an
industrial franchise, "the franchisee manufactures products according
to the franchisor's instructions and under the franchisor's trade-
mark."' 6 The franchisee under a service franchise "offers a service
under the business name or trademark of the franchisor according to
the franchisor's instructions."'" Finally, under a distribution
franchise, "the franchisee sells certain products in a shop bearing the
franchisor's business name, observing commercial methods developed
182. Presumably, the NBA's presence in the EC would further heighten the common
market's interest in basketball, thereby improving the level of competition in the existing
European leagues. As mentioned above, however, there is a possibility that the NBA could
harm the leagues.
183. EC: Franchising and 1992, Reuter Textline Euromoney International Financial Law,
Apr. 18, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLEUR file. Many American companies,
including McDonald's, Pizza Hut, and Holiday Inn, have taken part in the international
franchising that has spread throughout the EC. Id.
184. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 48; Block Exemption for Franchising Agreements,
BUSINESS GUIDE TO EC INITIATIVES § V, at 50 (Spring 1991).
185. Nicole Van Ranst, Drafting a Franchise Agreement, in DISTRIBUTORSHIPS, AGENCY
AND FRANCHISING IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARENA: EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND
LATIN AMERICA 175, 175-76 (1990).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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by the franchisor. The products may be manufactured by the
franchisor... and sold under his trademark or selected according to
criteria defined by the franchisor and sold under the original
trademark."'" As the Commission noted in ServiceMaster,89
there is a blurred distinction between service and distribution
franchises. Therefore, the fact that the NBA possesses characteristics
of both a service and distribution franchise system would be consid-
ered by the Commission.Y
While franchises are regulated closely in the United States by
"extensive and often draconian ... federal laws,"19' the EC has
regulated franchises through the more general antitrust provisions of
Article 85."9 One of the aims of the EC antitrust laws is to regulate
franchises in order to protect the financial investment of the franchi-
see and consumer interests, while also permitting the franchisor to
enlarge its network.93
EC law thus adopts a stance which is favorable to franchising
from a competition law standpoint: controls on franchising are
generally considered to be inappropriate.194 Under a franchising
model, the NBA would serve as franchisor and the expansion teams
in Europe would serve as franchisees. The European expansion
teams would use the NBA's intangible property rights and substantial
know-how in order to operate an NBA franchise. The arrangement
would combine aspects of both service and distribution franchises.
The EC's relevant treatment of franchising begins with the
European Court of Justice's Pronuptia decision. 95 In Pronuptia,
defendant Shillgalis had been granted an exclusive franchise to sell
188. Id.
189. Commission Decision 881604 of 14 November 1988 Relating to a Proceeding Under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1988 OJ. (L 332) 38 [hereinafter ServiceMaster] (franchises
throughout Europe for supply of housekeeping, cleaning and maintenance services held exempt
under Article 85(3)). ServiceMaster was the first Commission decision to deal with service
franchises. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 34.
190. See Service Master, supra note 189, at 39.
191. EC: Franchising and 1992, supra note 183.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Christian Joerges, Contract and Status in Franchising Law, in FRANCHISING AND THE
LAW: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNrrED STATES
11, 60 (Christian Joerges ed., 1991).
195. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, 1986
E.C.R. 353, 1 C.M.L.R. 414 (1986) [hereinafter Pronuptia]. For a detailed discussion of the
Pronuptia judgment, see KORAH II, supra note 84, at 19-23; de Cockbome, supra note 89, at
290-94.
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Pronuptia wedding gowns and party attire in three West German
cities.196 Shillgalis refused to pay the agreed royalties, and upon being
sued, asserted that the exclusive territories agreement violated Article
85(1) and was invalid."9 The Court limited its comments to what
it termed "distributional franchising," excluding production and
service franchising. The Court noted several competitive aspects of
distribution franchising:
15 ... . [distribution franchising] is a way for an undertaking
[franchisor] to derive financial benefit from its expertise without
investing its own capital. ... [T]he system gives traders [franchi-
sees] who do not have the necessary experience access to methods
which they could not have learned without considerable effort and
allows them to benefit from the reputation of the franchisor's
business name.... Such a system, which allows the franchisor to
profit from his success, does not in itself interfere with competi-
tion. . 9'
Thus, according to the Pronuptia court, ancillary restraints which are
essential to preventing the know-how and assistance needed by the
franchisee from benefitting competitors, are not restraints of trade
under Article 85(1).' 99  The Court unconditionally stated that
several other arrangements are outside of Article 85(1).2 These
include the franchisee's duty to have the franchisee's shop arranged
in accordance with franchisor's instructions; to locate his or her shop
at an agreed upon location; and, not to either relocate it to another
address or to assign franchisee's rights and duties absent consent of
the franchisor.20 ' Significantly, instead of holding the aforemen-
tioned restrictions to be exempt under Article 85(3), the Court held
that they do not even infringe upon Article 85(1) in the first
196. KORAH I1, supra note 84, at 19.
197. Id.
198. Pronuptia, supra note 195, at 1986 E.C.R. 381,1 C.M.L.R. 442. The system in premised
upon two conditions being met:
16. First, the franchisor must be able to communicate his know-how to the franchisees
and provide them with the necessary assistance in order to enable them to apply his
methods, without running the risk that know-how and assistance might benefit
competitors, even indirectly.
17. Secondly, the franchisor must be able to take the measures necessary for
maintaining the identity and reputation of the network bearing his business name or
symbol. It follows that provisions which establish the means of control necessary for
that purpose do not constitute restrictions on competition for purposes of Article 85(1).
Id. at 1986 E.C.R. 381-82, 1 C.M.L.R. 442.
199. Id. at 1986 E.C.R. 385, 1 C.M.L.R. 414.
200. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 20.
201. Id.
1994]
322 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:291
place.' The Court's approach is clear-cut and lacks the unpredict-
ability of the balancing technique characteristic of the Rule of Reason
in the United States.20 3
The Pronuptia court also held that the appropriation of an
exclusive territory required an exemption once the franchising
network became widespread. Concerned that franchisors would
encounter problems in collecting royalties based on the granting of
such exclusivity, the European Commission vigorously sought out
individual cases to exempt. °" In order to adopt a group exemption
under the power vested in it by Regulation 19/65,2°0 the Commission
needed to approve several individual exemptions for franchise
agreements under Article 85(3).2' Following the Pronuptia judg-
ment, the Commission did in fact exempt exclusive and partially
exclusive territory agreements in numerous service and distribution
franchise arrangements: Pronuptia2  and Yves Rocher in De-
cember 1986, Computerland10  in July 1987, and ServiceMaster?
and Charles Jourdan212 in December 1988.213 The German Films
202. Id. at 21.
203. Id.; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text for discussion of the Rule of
Reason and the balancing approach.
204. KORA- II, supra note 84, at 23.
205. Id. at 23-24.
206. Council Regulation 19165 of 2 March 1965 on the Application of Article 85(3), 1965 O.J.
533. Recital 4 of the empowering regulation, number 19/65, states that the Commission may
exercise the power after sufficient experience has been gained in light of the individual decisions.
KORAH II, supra note 84, at 129.
207. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 24-25.
208. Pronuptia, supra note 195, at 39 (holding sale of bridal wear and accessories in
franchises throughout Europe, Canada, United States, and Japan are exempt under Article
85(3)). The agreement exempted by the Commission was not identical to the one exempted by
the Court of Justice, although it was similar. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 26.
209. Commission Decision 87/14 of 17 December 1986 Relating to a Proceeding Under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1987 O.J. (L 8) 49 [hereinafter Yves Rocher] (holding that Yves
Rocher's selection of only one franchisee for a given territory, its commitment not to establish
a shop itself in the territory of each of its franchisees, and its prohibition on the opening of a
second shop in the franchisee's territory restricted competition within the distribution network).
210. Commission Decision 87/407 of 13 July 1987 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty, 1987 O.J (L 222) 12 [hereinafter Computerland] (holding United States
corporation with franchises in France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Luxembourg
exempt under Article 85(3)).
211. ServiceMaster, supra note 188.
212. Commission Decision 89/94 of 2 December1988 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 OJ. (L 35) 31 [hereinafter Charles Jourdan] (holding sale of shoes
and handbags by company through franchises outside of France exempt under Article 85(3)).
213. From a factual standpoint, several of these decisions shed light on NBA expansion into
Europe. Specifically, Computerland and ServiceMaster are of particular relevance: the former
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case, also reflects the Commission's stance toward international
agreements bringing technology into the EC, although the case did
not involve a franchise.1 4 The German Films case involved an
agreement in which a German television company purchased the
exclusive rights to American films in order to present them in
Germany and sublicense them to other broadcasting organiza-
tions."' The Commission granted an individual exemption under
Article 85(3) because the agreements in question resulted in improve-
ments in the distribution of goods (films available to be seen) in the
relevant market, benefitted consumers, and involved indispensable
restrictions which were incapable of eliminating competition.216
Likewise, the NBA would possibly argue, the expansion of its league
into Europe would have a similar effect on the market.
2. The Requirements of Regulation 4087/88. The Commission's
decisions laid the foundation for the formation of a block exemption
from Article 85(1) for service and distribution franchises in the
EC.217 This block exemption, issued on November 30, 1988, and in
force from February 1, 1989, until December 1, 1999, attempts to
maintain a fragile balance between the interests of consumers and
franchisors.1 8 Compliance with the terms of the Regulation allows
franchisors to gain automatic exemptions from Article 85,2 9 demon-
strating the Commission's willingness to relax its enforcement of the
competition laws with respect to franchise agreements. Moreover,
under this block exemption, a franchisor may grant a franchisee the
right to exploit a franchise for purposes of marketing specified goods
and services.' 0 It is believed that the block exemption will encour-
because it involved an American corporation franchising in Europe, and the latter because it
consisted of a provider of a service (housecleaning) roughly analogous to the NBA (as a supplier
of a good/service). Computerland, supra note 210; ServiceMaster, supra note 188. For a
discussion of the NBA as a good/service, see supra notes 118-25. In each case, the Commission
granted an Article 85(3) exemption.
214. Commission Decision 89/536 of 15 September 1989 Relating to a Proceeding Under
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 1989 OJ. (L 284) 36 [hereinafter German Films Case] (holding
film purchases by German television station of rights to several movies from Turner
Broadcasting exempt under 85(3)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95. The difficulty encountered in enforcing franchise
agreements after the Pronuptia judgment pressured the Commission to create this block
exemption. KORAH II, supra note 84, at 35.
218. EC: Franchising and 1992, supra note 183.
219. Id.
220. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 49.
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age more investment in the EC by franchisors both from Member
States and abroad, especially from the United States and Canada. 1
Arguably, NBA expansion into Europe would exemplify one type of
foreign investment that the block exemption seeks to promote.
Nevertheless, the NBA would have to conform to the requirements
of Regulation 4087/88, which might require some adaptation to the
Constitution and By-laws of the NBA in the United States.
Regulation 40 87 /8 8 m applies to service and distribution fran-
chises. Article 1(3) defines two key terms, "franchise"'  and
"franchise agreement." 4 Article 1(1) exempts franchise agreements
which include at least one of the restrictions listed under Article
2.' Article 2 contains restrictions on, among other things, both the
franchisor and franchisee's ability to exploit the franchise, conclude
agreements with third parties, and sell the goods that are the subject
of the franchise agreement outside of the contract territory. 622
Article 3, the White List, outlines two lists of provisions to which
Article 1 of the Regulation shall apply: those provisions that "are
necessary to protect the franchisor's industrial or intellectual property
rights or to maintain the common identity and reputation of the
franchised network," 7 and those that are unconditional and thereby
fall under Article I' Furthermore, Article 3(3) exempts the
provisions in Article 3(2) from Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty, even
if they are "not accompanied by any of the obligations exempted by
Article .' Therefore, the provisions in Article 3(1) are exempted
221. EC: Franchising and 1992, supra note 183.
222. Of course, the requirements of this regulation need not be met if an agreement does
not violate Article 85(1). KORAH II, supra note 84, at 129.
223. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 48.
224. Id. The Commission Regulation defines franchise agreements as follows:
"[F]ranchise agreement" means an agreement whereby one undertaking, the franchisor,
grants the other, the franchisee, in exchange for direct or indirect financial consider-
ation, the right to exploit a franchise for the purposes of marketing specified types of
goods and/or services; it includes at least obligations relating to:
-the use of a common name or shop sign and a uniform presentation of
contract premises and/or means of transport,
-the communication by the franchisor to the franchisee of know-how,
-the continuing provision by the franchisor to the franchisee of commercial
or technical assistance during the life of the agreement.
Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 49.
227. Id. Article 3(1) mirrors the ECJ's statement in Pronuptia. See supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
228. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 49-50.
229. Id. at 50.
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under Article 2 of the Regulation, but nevertheless are voidable in the
unlikely case that they violate Article 85(1)."o
Article 4 contains three conditions associated with cross-frontier
trade and independence which must be satisfied to gain shelter under
Regulation 4087/88"3 While Article 3 provides provisions which
are permissible, Article 5 contains the blacklisted clauses which, if
included, destroy the exemption. 2 Articles 6 and 7 comprise the
"opposition procedure," whereby the parties to an agreement may
announce an agreement covered by the block exemption which (1)
contains no blacklisted clauses, (2) satisfies all of the conditions listed
in Article 4, but which (3) also includes a provision in restraint of
trade that is not explicitly exempted.33 Such an agreement will be
exempted under Regulation 4087/88 if the Commission fails to oppose
it within six months.P The "opposition procedure" was instituted
as a means of providing legal certainty and simplifying the
Regulation's administration. 5 Finally, Article 8 of the Regulation
provides the Commission with the power to withdraw the exemption
by an individual decision when it determines that the agreement has
effects which are inconsistent with Article 85(3).6
Given this overview, questions exist as to the utility of Regulation
4087/88.' Specifically, the definition of "franchise agreement" has
been deemed imprecise, making it unclear as to which agreements the
regulation applies.'2 8 For instance, as discussed below, the NBA's
practices would probably not violate the substantive provisions of
Regulation 4087/88. Arguably, therefore, the largest hurdle facing the
NBA is satisfying the Regulation's definition of "franchise agree-
ment."
3. Regulation 4087/88 Applied to NBA's Constitution and By-
laws. Instead of entering into a conventional franchise agreement
230. KoRAH II, supra note 84, at 76.
231. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 50. The franchisee may obtain goods that are the
subject matter of the franchise from other franchises. An obligation of the franchisee to honor
guarantees applies to any goods supplied by the franchised network. The franchisee must
indicate its status as an independent undertaking. Id.
232. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 50.
233. KoRAH II, supra note 84, at 90.
234. Id. at 90.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 111. The Commission is required by Article 7 of Regulation 19/65 to withdraw
the exemption under such circumstances. Id.
237. See generally KORAH II, supra note 84, at 133-34.
238. Id. at 133.
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with each member of the league, each NBA team simply agrees to
abide by the Constitution and By-laws of the National Basketball
Association. 9 The Constitution and By-laws operate as the func-
tional equivalent of a centralized franchise agreement between the
NBA and each team. Therefore, the Constitution and By-laws can be
treated as the franchise agreement for purposes of evaluating whether
the NBA could gain a block exemption under Regulation 4087/88.
Although the NBA is technically a joint venture, it nevertheless
possesses the characteristics of a franchising network with the NBA
as the franchisor and each team as a franchisee. The NBA, as a
combination of a distribution and service franchise, appears to fall
within the Regulation's general scope. First, the NBA satisfies the
Regulation's definition of "franchise:" an NBA franchise carries with
it the intellectual property rights belonging to the NBA, gains the
NBA's significant know-how and assistance in the operation of a
professional basketball team, and participates in a league of teams.
The overall result of the franchise is to allow individual teams to
"exploit" the "provision of services to end users (basketball
fans)."' 4 Second, by analogy the Constitution and By-laws operate
as a franchise agreement under Regulation 4087/88. Specifically, the
right to "exploit a franchise for the purposes of marketing specified
... services" is granted to each team in exchange for an entrance fee
(determined by the NBA), and the Constitution and By-laws contain
obligations relating to the use of a common name, know-how, and
continuing assistance provided by the NBA to each member through-
out the life of the agreement.241
The Constitution and By-laws also provide restrictions that come
within Article 2 of the Regulation, thereby triggering the exemption.
Among the restrictions are the obligations of NBA teams not to
assign the rights of the franchise to third parties without league
approval,242 not to relocate the franchise without the NBA's approv-
al,243 and to refrain from seeking fans outside of specified territories
through cable broadcasts.2
239. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46.
240. See Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 48.
241. Id.
242. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46, at 4-6; Regulation 4087/88 supra note 95, at
49.
243. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46, at 7-10; Regulation 4087188, supra note 95, at
49.
244. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46, at 61; Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at
149. Although this restriction is not identical to that in Article 2(d), it is similar enough to
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The NBA would benefit from the White Listed provisions, either
conditionally or unconditionally, under Article 3 of the Regulation.
Specifically, Article 3(1) would permit the NBA's territorial restric-
tions on franchise relocation and the requirement to share with the
league a portion of television and gate receipts.24s More significant-
ly, Article 3(2) would unconditionally authorize the NBA to prevent
franchises from: disclosing confidential know-how about the league
to third parties; taking advantage of the NBA's know-how for any
other purpose than to run a basketball franchise; using the NBA's
commercial methods and intellectual property rights; not complying
with the NBA's guidelines for the presentation of arenas,246 etc.;
relocating the franchise without the NBA's consent; and assigning the
rights of the franchise without the approval of the NBA's Board of
Governors. 247
In order for Regulation 4087/88 to apply to the NBA, Article 4's
conditions must be satisfied. While the first two conditions of Article
4 are not applicable to the NBA, 4 the third is easily satisfied since
the franchisees, individual teams, maintain their formal status of
independent undertakings.2 49 Therefore, the NBA does not violate
any of Article 4's conditions, making the league eligible to comply
with Regulation 4087/88.
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, the NBA, through its
Constitution, does not utilize any of the Black Listed clauses found in
Article 5 of Regulation 4087/880' Most of the prohibited clauses
are not applicable to the NBA, and with respect to those that are
relevant, the NBA's current procedures are acceptable35'
deserve consideration.
245. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46, at 59; Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at
49.
246. "Presentation of arenas" is a term of art referring to the physical set-up of the sport
arenas.
247. Constitution and By-laws, supra note 46, at 4-10; Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95,
at 49-50.
248. The first two conditions consider goods that are easily marketable and tangible as
products, while in this instance, the NBA is more of a service. Constitution and By-laws, supra
note 46, at 41; Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 50.
249. The NBA can indicate its status as an independent undertaking.
250. See Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 50.
251. For example, under Article 5(e) the NBA allows each team to set its own ticket,
merchandise, and concession prices. Under Article 5(f) the franchisees are allowed to challenge
the intellectual property rights of the NBA as franchisor. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, art.
5); See Constitution and By-laws, supra note 45, at 30. The ongoing battle between the NBA
and the Chicago Bulls evinces this ability to challenge the league. See infra note 253 for a
discussion of the Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership case.
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Based on the above analysis, the NBA could qualify for a block
exemption under Regulation 4087/88. Of course, such an exemption
is contingent upon the NBA's practices iemaining consistent with the
policies of Article 85(3). This last condition is an essential character-
istic of any exemption, individual or block, that the NBA could enjoy.
4. Effects of Deeming the NBA's Practices Outside of or Exempt
from Article 85(1). The policies behind granting individual and block
exemptions to service and distribution franchises suggest a possibility
of NBA expansion into Europe under an exemption to Article 85(1).
The NBA would be, in a sense, nothing more than a franchisor
attempting to establish new franchises that could sell its goods and
service, basketball, as both a product and as entertainment, to people
in the EC.
On the other hand, the individual and block exemptions granted
to franchises can be revoked if the practices committed under the
respective exemptions are contrary to the objectives of Article 85.2
Nevertheless, the benefits that the NBA would confer on consumers
in the EC, including exposure to higher quality basketball, would,
presumably, outweigh any restraints on trade that accompany
expansion, and would therefore satisfy the central objective of the
regulation.
E. Potential Conflicts Between EC and American Antitrust Law
Although the antitrust laws of the EC and the United States are
generally similar, it appears that EC competition policy would be less
threatening toward NBA teams in Europe than American antitrust
policies are to sports leagues in the United States.213 Upon expan-
sion into Europe, the NBA would probably receive an Article 85(3)
252. Regulation 4087/88, supra note 95, at 51.
253. For an example of strict antitrust enforcement against the NBA in the American courts,
see Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that limiting the number of games a team may broadcast on a cable superstation
to twenty violated the Sherman Act, despite the antitrust exemption the NBA enjoys under the
Sports Broadcasting Act).
The Sports Broadcasting Act, passed in 1961, states that:
The antitrust laws ... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among persons
engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball,
basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs.., sells or otherwise transfers all
or any part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of
games ... engaged in or conducted by such clubs ....
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961) (italics added). Why then, if baseball's antitrust exemption is secure,
did Congress include baseball among the sports exempted under this statute?
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exemption, thereby providing the NBA's European expansion teams
with substantial leeway to operate free from antitrust scrutiny. The
situation in the United States, although similar, is more tenuous. As
discussed above, the exemption from antitrust scrutiny which the
NBA currently enjoys stems not from an antitrust analysis, but from
a labor exemption included in the collective bargaining agreement
between the NBA and the Players' Association. Decertification of
the Players' Association, a move threatened in 1987-88 and possible
in 1994, would destroy this labor exemption1 4 If the NBA were to
gain an exemption from EC antitrust laws and the Players' Associa-
tion was then decertified, the NBA would be subject to antitrust
scrutiny in the United States but exempt from such attacks in
Europe.' 5 The result could be the recognition in the EC of the
college draft, salary cap, and right of first refusal, while these same
restraints could be open to attack and possible antitrust sanctions?5'
in the United States. With this "worst case scenario" lurking in the
background, the future of NBA expansion into Europe, from an
antitrust standpoint, is uncertain.
V. THE CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE (CFL)
COUNTEREXAMPLE: EXPANSION INTO THE UNITED
STATES
The CFL's recent expansion into the United States provides an
interesting comparison to potential NBA expansion into Europe. In
addition to raising antitrust issues, CFL expansion demonstrates the
crucial role played by economic considerations.
A. Background of the Canadian Content Rule
The CFL expanded into the United States for the first time when
it awarded an expansion franchise to Sacramento, California on
January 12, 1993.257 Recently, the CFL awarded American franchis-
es to Baltimore, Las Vegas, and Shreveport (LA) with play to begin
in the fall of 1994."~ The purpose of the expansion was to broaden
254. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
255. For purposes of this analysis, issues of comity, extraterritoriality, and choice of law will
not be discussed.
256. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
257. Rick Matsumoto, Expansion: CFL's Recipe for Success or Disaster, TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 11, 1993, at Al.
258. Archie McDonald, Canadian Players Will be Left Out as CFL Expands to U.S.,
VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 7, 1994, at Dl. Four more American teams are expected to join the
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the CFL's "financial and competitive horizons." 9  One major
concern with expansion into the United States has been the plight of
Canadian-born players in the CFL. The CFL has a longstanding rule
that every team must have at least twenty native-born Canadians on
its thirty-seven-player roster. This rule, the Canadian Content Rule,
ensures that Canadians have the opportunity to participate in the
league.2  Additionally, the Canadian Content Rule preserves
amateur and university football in Canada by allowing young football
players to have legitimate dreams of playing in the CFL.26' Without
the rule, young Canadian football players, seeing no "specific place
for them in their own game," might switch to another sport.262
Legally, however, the CFL could not enforce the Canadian
Content Rule against either the Sacramento franchise, or its other
American teams.26 The rule potentially violates American la-
bor,2 64 immigration,25 and antitrust laws.26 Specifically, the rule
would presumably be an unlawful restraint of trade under the
Sherman Act. Under American antitrust law, football players
compete for their jobs based on their skills rather than their nationali-
ty.267 Therefore, the rule applies only to the eight existing Canadian
teams; Sacramento, the only American CFL team to complete its
roster, faced no restrictions on nationality.2  Similarly, the three
new American teams will be allowed to disregard the Canadian
CFL in the near future. Id.
259. Matsumoto, supra note 257, at Al.
260. Because Americans receive more extensive college football coaching than Canadians,
the Canadian Content Rule allows those Canadians who have talent, but lack coaching, to
develop. Paul Hunter, Pass-Catching Greats Immortalized by CFL, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 25,
1993, at H5.
261. Matsumoto, supra note 257, at Al.
262. Johnson, Surin Both Confident, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1993, at D2.
263. McDonald, supra note 258, at Dl. Ken Warren, CFL Footbalk Gold Miners Don't
Need To Go With Canadians, OTTAWA CTIZEN, Feb. 27,1993, at G6; Ruling Says Miners Don't
Need Canadians, FIN'L POST, Feb. 27, 1993, §5, at 46.
264. Mark Zwolinski, Foray Into U.S. to Cost Canadians Jobs, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 9,
1993, at C6.
265. Id.
266. Daniels, supra note 3, § 6, at 50. For purposes of this discussion, the focus will be on
the antitrust aspects of the rule.
267. See id.
268. See McDonald, supra note 258, at Dl.
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Content Rule. 9 As a result, the CFL has not held an expansion
draft for any of its American teams.270
Many feel that not applying the Canadian Content Rule will
provide the American CFL teams with a competitive advantage, since
Americans are generally considered to be more experienced at
football than Canadians.27 In addition, the Canadian Content Rule
could quickly disappear if the teams in the United States dominate
the CFL with predominantly American rosters.272
B. CFL Example Compared to NBA Expansion Into Europe
The CFL was forced to adjust its Canadian Content Rule in order
to comply with American antitrust law when it expanded into the
United States. Presumably, the NBA would not be willing to adjust
its restraints so drastically in order to expand into Europe. The
difference between the two situations, aside from the fact that the
NBA's restraints would presumably be legal under EC law, centers on
economic leverage. Simply put, the CFL had no leverage when it
expanded. The CFL contended that "if U.S. expansion doesn't
happen, if the rosters aren't changed to suit the U.S. laws, the league
dies [;] ... if not for U.S. ownership in Toronto and Ottawa, the
league would already be dead."'273 The NBA on the other hand, is
financially prosperous and has the luxury of expanding on its own
terms and subject to more of its own objectives. It for example, one
of its rules violated another country's laws, the NBA could afford to
create pressure for an exemption under those laws, or expand
somewhere else.274 The lesson to be learned from the CL
counterexample is simple: economic leverage does play a role in
269. See id.
270. See Paul Hunter, CFL's Governors Going Head to Head to Smash Gridlock, TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 23,1993, at D22. Because of the discrepancy between the number of Canadian-born
players on the Canadian rosters and the American CFL rosters, the CFL did not allow any of
the American teams to partcipate in the league's college draft. See McDonald, supra note 258,
at DI; Allan Maki, Rift Brewing Over Draft, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 16, 1993, at D1.
271. Pat Hickey, CFL's Latest Blunder Might Create Powerhouse in Sacramento, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 1993, at D2.
272. Frank Orr, NBA Insider Claims Toronto's a Sure Bet, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 28, 1993,
at E8.
273. Daniels, supra note 3, § 6, at 50.
274. For example, as a condition for expansion into Toronto, the NBA required that Ontario
eliminate legalized gambling on NBA games. Doug Smith, Hoops: Here It Comes: Toronto
has a Dea4 Vancouver Removes Big Hurdle, FIN. POST, Feb. 11, 1994, at 39. Faced with the
possibility of losing the Toronto franchise, the Ontario government complied with the NBA's
demand. Id.
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international sports league expansion, and that role should not be lost
behind the legalese that surrounds the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it presently stands, antitrust exemptions for professional sports
leagues are interpreted narrowly in the United States.275 There is
currently a trend towards more vigorous antitrust scrutiny of
American sports leagues, as seen by both the Dudley 6 and Chicago
Prof Sports casesYm  This may stem from a perception of sports
leagues as being mainly profit-seeking entities, rather than organiza-
tions whose main priority is to provide a competitive and exciting
product for the fans. Ironically, of all the American sports leagues,
this perception appears to be least applicable to the NBA, because
the NBA offers such a popular and well-balanced league. Neverthe-
less, the NBA may find itself subject to increased antitrust scrutiny in
the coming years, which could jeopardize the foundation of the
financial growth it has enjoyed over the past decade.278
In contrast, EC competition laws appear to be less intrusive than
American antitrust policies. Moreover, the EC laws are more definite
and provide more certainty through their statutory and regulatory
framework: Article 85(3) signifies a more stable approach to antitrust
relief than its rather amorphous counterpart in the United States, the
Rule of Reason. In addition to possibly qualifying for a standard
Article 85(3) individual exemption, it is possible that the NBA could
enjoy either a block exemption for service and distributional
275. See supra note 253, discussing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Chicago
Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n. In interpreting the Sports
Broadcasting Act, which exempts from antitrust review all agreements and joint transfers of
rights from leagues to networks, the Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership court took a narrow
view. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 961 F.2d 667.
276. Dudley, 838 F. Supp. 172. See supra notes 69-71 for a discussion of Dudley.
277. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership, 961 F.2d 667. See supra note 253 for a discussion
of Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership.
278. The increased antitrust scrutiny currently focused upon the NBA can be viewed as part
of a broader trend toward stricter antitrust enforcement against American professional sports
leagues. In the NFL, the recent decision in the McNeil case instituted a more liberal free agency
system. McNeil, 1992-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 69,982; See supra note 37 for a further discussion
of McNeil. With respect to Major League Baseball (MLB), Congress has recently held hearings
examining the league's antitrust exemption, which MLB has enjoyed since 1922. Mike Dodd,
Lawmakers to Owners: Straighten Up, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1993, at 4C. Potentially, other
leagues, including the NBA, could face more antitrust scrutiny if MLB's exemption is repealed
because then the variation in treatment between MLB and other sports leagues would be
lessened. Moreover, even though repeal of MLB's antitrust exemption is unlikely, the fact that
Congress is willing to examine it closely evinces a mood of stricter antitrust enforcement.
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franchises, or an individual exemption under the relaxed standards
imposed upon cooperative joint ventures in the EC. A final differ-
ence between antitrust scrutiny in the EC and in the United States
stems from the EC's overarching policy favoring the elimination of
internal and external trade frontiers. It is this very policy that favors
NBA expansion into the EC. Therefore, the only thing preventing
the NBA from expanding into Europe is the NBA itself.
Paul R. Genender

